Abstract : The cryptographic strength of an SP network depends crucially on the strength of its substitution boxes (S-boxes). In this paper we use the concept of information leakage to evaluate the strength of Sboxes and SP networks. We define a n equivalence class on n x n S-boxes that is invariant in information leakage. Simulation results for a 16x 16 SP network suggest that after a sufficient number of rounds the distribution of the output XOR in the SP network looks random. We further present simulation results to show that the information leakage for a n SP network diminishes more rapidly with the number of rounds when the S-boxes are cryptographically strong.
Introduction
The concept of "confusion" and "diffusion", which led to the design of Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) cryptosystems (e.g., DES [l] ), was first introduced by Shannon [2] and was elaborated on in concrete and practical ways by Feistel [31 and Feistel, Notz and Smith [4] . The strength of an SP network depends highly on the strength of the substitution boxes (S-boxes). Work on the design and analysis of S-boxes has been presented in [5] [61[71~811931101.
Kam and Davida [ l l ] presented an approach to the design of S-boxes and SP networks which is guaranteed to satisfy completeness, a property which requires that each output bit depends on every input bit. Since then, very little work has been done on the design and analysis of a general SP network [12] [13], even though many fully designed cryptosystems have been published [ 1411151. In this work we review some previously proposed evaluation criteria based on information leakage and extend them for an n x n bijective S-box. We then define an equivalence class on S-boxes which will enable one to create cryptographically strong S-boxes more efficiently. We also present simulation results to show that cryptographically strong S-boxes improve the performance of an SP network. 
Evaluation Criteria for a Cryptographically Strong S-box
ForrC [91 presented a set of cryptographic properties of S-boxes based on information theory. Dawson & Tavares [lo] extended Forre's ideas to define an expanded set of design criteria for cryptographically strong S-boxes. The authors viewed an S-box in two different ways : static view, which models an S-box when the inputs are steady and dynamic view, which models an S-box when the inputs change. Forrt's criteria, however, apply to the static model only. In the Dawson & Tavares' design framework both an S-box and its inverse were designed to have low information leakage. The expanded set of design criteria was developed at a "single" bit level, where information leakage between a single output bit and the input bits or between a single output bit and the rest of the output bits were computed. We extend the design criteria to a "multiple" bit level, where information leakage between one or more output bits and the input bits or between one or more output bits and the rest of the output bits are considered. We further show that some of the new design criteria defined in [lo] are redundant. We also introduce a useful information theoretic property, which we call "XOR Information Leakage" (XL[I;O]) for an S-box. The attractive feature of this property is that it uses a "single quantity" to compare the XOR dlstributions of S-boxes and SP networks. The n x n S-box S considered in this section is a bijective S-box with an n-bit input X= ( 2 , , z q , ..., z n } and an n-bit output Y= {yl I yi ~ .... yn} ; where 2 , and y, ; 1 5 i 5 n are binary variables. The input-output mapping of an S-box is assumed to be known, i.e., the output is assumed to be known when the input is completely known (or vice versa) . In an ideal S-box, however, partial information about the input bits should not reduce the uncertainty in the unknown output bits (or vice versa).
Static Input-Output Information Leakage
The static view of the S-box is shown in Figure 1 . If Xk= { lj, x I 2 , . . , l xJk} ; where 1 5 k 5 n. Tables 2 and 3 . In these tables, the information leakage is given in bits/input. The S-boxes considered in the example are as follows :
DES S-box
: [ 0, 15, 7, 4, 14, 2, 13, 1, 10, 6, 12, 11, 9, 5, 3, 8 ] Dawson & Tavares S-box : ( 7,9,1,1O,12,14,0,5,4,13,11,6,2,3,15,8 1. In an ideal S-box information about any changes in the input bits should not reduce the uncertainty in the changes in the output bits.
The dynamic view of an S-box (delta S-box) is shown in Figure 2 Table 4 . The detailed DL[I;O] matrix for the DES S-box is given in Table 5 . In these tables, the information leakage is given in bits/input change.
Dawson & Tavares S-box In [lo] Output-Input Information Leakage, which is the same as the Input-Output Information Leakage, except that the input and the output are interchanged, has been defined as a separate property in both the static and the dynamic cases. But due to the symmetry in mutual information, i.e., I ( A ; R ) = I ( B ; A), the output-input information leakage mamx is simply the transposiuon of the input-output infomation leakage mamx in both the static and the dynamic cases for any bijective S-box. Therefore, the output-input information leakage is a redundant criterion for both the static and the dynamic conditions for any bijective S-box. Table 7 . In these tables, the information leakage is given in bits/output change.
I I
DES S-box The XOR distribution gives the probability distribution of the input XOR and the output XOR for an S-box. Biharn & Sharnir [16] first used the XOR distribution €or their differential attack on DES-like cryptosystems. The XOR distribution of the DES S-box of the above example is given in Table 8 .
If AX is the input XOR and AY is the output XOR, then the XOR Input-Output Information Leakage is the mutual information between A X and AY and is given by :
XL[I; 0 1 = I ( A Y ; AX) = H ( A Y ) -H(dY I AX).
In an n x n S-box, for any given input XOR, if each output XOR occurs with equal probability,<the XOR distribution must have all identical entries. Such an XOR distribution is called a "uniform" or "flat" distribution. The "differential probability" corresponding to an entry in the XOR distribution is obtained by dividing that entry by 2", where n is the block size of the S-box (or SP-nehvork). Thus, in a uniform XOR distribution the highest differential probability is 1/?. For a uniform XOR distribution XL[I;O] is zero. However, due to the nature of the XOR operation, each output XOR either occurs an even number of times or d w not occur at all. Further, in an S-box when A X = 0, AY = 0. Thus, a zero input XOR and the corresponding output XORs are trivial.
In the XOR distribution for an n x n S -box the sum of the envies in a row is 2", and if the S-box is bijective the sum of the entries in a column is also 2n. Therefore, in the "best possible distribution" for an n x n S-box, an entry corresponding to a non-zero input XOR can be either 0 or 2. Thus, for a non-zero input XOR half of the possible output XORs do not occur. For a 4x4 S-box with the best possible distribution, XL[I;O] will be 1.1875 bits/input XOR which is the minimum value of XL[I;O] for any 4 x 4 S-box. However, Adams [I71 showed that an nxn S-box with the best possible XOR distribution cannot be bijective when n is even. 
An Equivalence Class on S-boxes
Consider the nxn S-box S' created by XORing X, and Y, with the input and the output respectively of thc n x n S-box S as shown in Figure 3 . X, and Y, are arbitraq fixed n-bit binary vectors. O]) will be the same for both S and S'. Therefore, in this fashion, we can generate 22" equivalent n x n S-boxes with invariant information leakage and with different input-output mapping.
A new S-box S" can be generated by permuting the input and/or output bits Of the original S-box S. S" will have similar cryptographic properties to S. However, due to the bit permutation, the entries of the leakage matrices and the XOR distribution of S" may be located differently. Starting with S", a new class of S-boxes can be generated using the above procedure. Hence, if a single S-box with low information leakage is found (possibly through a computer search), a large number of S-boxeS with similar information leakage can be created easily. I. There exists a pair of (r-l)* round outputs Y,-i and Y:-l such that Prob(dY,-1 I AX) is greater than l/am, where m is the cipher block size.
Differential Attack on SP Networks
11. Given some pairs of Y,-l and Yk-l it is possible to determine some key bits in the r* round. The effectiveness of this line of attack depends on how confidently the (r-1)* round XOR values (corresponding to the chosen input XOR) can be predicted in the SP network. In the cryptosystem, if XL[I;O] is zero after the (r-1)* round then the maximum differential probability reaches the ideal value which is l / a m (m is the cipher block size). Hence, the first condition will be satisfied. However, due to the nature of the XOR operation, an SP network with even the best possible XOR distribution will have a differential probability of 1/2m-(i.e., 2/2m).
In an SP network, keying can be introduced in one of the two ways shown in Figure 4 . DES uses a combination of these two methods. In Figure 4 {a), the (r-1) * the actual input to the S-box. Using the actual input and the value of C, . l (if known) the uncertainty in K, can be reduced. However, in an SPN cryptosystem using this keying arrangement, if the value of C, . l is not available (note that this condition is not satisfied in DES-like systems), a differential cryptanalyst cannot learn about the key using the knowledge or the input XOR and the output XOR of the S-box.
In Figure 4 (b), one bit in K, is used to select one of the two S-boxes : S1 and SZ. In this arrangement, K, is not mixed with C,-I to form the actual input to the S-box in the r * round. Since in this illustration only two S-boxes are used, a single key bit is sufficient to select an S-box. This arrangement is vulnerable to a differential attack if the two S-boxes do not have identical XOR distributions 2131. It has been pointed out by Heys [20] that a differential attack is possible, even if the S-boxes have identical XOR distributions (i.e., if S1 and SZ are chosen from an equivalence class). This can be explained with the help of Figure 5 . Therefore, an SP network using onc or a combination of the above keying techniques should be designed to minimize the maximum entry in the XOR distribution (i.e., maximum differential probability), in order to increase the immunity against differential attack.
Analysis of a 16-bit SP Network
In an r round SPN cryptosystem the substitution-permutation function is iterated r times so that the final product (ciphertext) is cryptographically stronger than the intermediate products. The number of rounds required depends strongly on the strength of the individual layers. If the individual layers are strong, the number of rounds required can be smaller which means that higher data encryption/decryption rates can be achieved. In order to study the influence of the S-boxes on the cryptographic properties of an SP network, a I 6 x 16 SP network (which is tractable) shown in Figure 6 was evaluated with respect to various criteria explained above. The DES, Dawson & Tavares and some randomly selectcd S-boxes were used for this analysis. We found that some of the DES S-boxes are relatively stronger than the others with respect to information leakage. Therefore, under each evaluation criterion, the DES S-boxes with relatively low information leakage @ES-L) and relatively high information leakage (DES-H) were analyzed separately. We first studied how the maximum differential probability of the SP network varies with the number of rounds (for the purpose of this test DES S-boxes were ranked according to their XL[I;O]). We know that cven in the best case a non-zero minimum entry in the XOR distribution of the SP network is 2, Hence, for any nonzero input XOR, at least 50% of the output XORs do not occur. Since the S-boxes used are bijective, the l c b i t SP network is also bijective. As in the case of an S-box, a bijective SP network with XOR distribution containing only 0's and 2's is not realizable when the block size is even, which is true for the 16-bit SP network. Therefore, we can expect some entries in the XOR dismbution which are greater than 2. Figure 7 shows the variation of the maximum entry in the XOR distribution (for 100 randomly selected non-zero input XORs) with the number of rounds. For all the S-boxes used, the highest entry in the XOR distribution convcrged to 14 (i.c., the maximum differential probability is 14/216) after 5 rounds. Further, after 3 rounds there was not much difference in the maximum differential probability regardless of the selection of S-boxes. However, the S-boxes with low XL[I;O] led to faster convergencc. In addition, we noted that for all the S-boxes the percentage of 0's (in a row) was 60.7% of the number of possible output XORs, once the convergence was achieved. We and Heys 1201 observed that the distribution of entries in a b' w e n row in the XOR distnbution, after a sufficient number of rounds, behaves like a random placement of n/2 balls in n bins, where each ball has a value of 2. The maximum entry in a row corresponding to the random placemcnts was observed to be less than or equal to 14.
A well designed SP network can be rcgarded as a large strong S-box. Hence an ideal SP network should satisfy all the cryptographic properties of an ideal S-box.
We then examined the 16-bit SP network on a round-by-round basis with respect m the four types of information ledages. For selected input and output bits the system was tested exhaustively, where feasible, or using a large number of randomly chosen inputs. The simulation results ate shown in Figures 8 through 11 . 
Conclusions
We reviewed evaluation criteria for n x n bijective S-boxes based on information leakage and i n l n d u d Lhc; wmpl d XOR Information Leakage (XLF;O]), which is useful in comparing the XOR distributions of S-boxes. We then defined an equivalence class on n x n S-boxes which have invariant information leakage. 'Ihe equivalm classes w i l l reduce the search space for the design of cryptographically strong Sboxes with low information leakage. We also found that not all the DES $-boxes ~I C equally strong with respect t o information leakage. We s&died the impact of the choice of S-boxes on the cryptographic properties of a 16x 16 SP network using various S-boxes. Sample S-boxes were chosen fmm the DES, Dawson & lWares, and randomly consmcted ones. The vatlatlon of the maximum entry in the XOR distribution with the ngmber of rounds W w n in Figure  7 . This experimental XOR distribution (comspon&%g to 100 randomly selected nonzero input XORs) closely approximates a random distribution of the output XORs after 5 rounds. After 3 rounds rhere is not much difference in the maximum entry in the XOR distribution regardless of the selection of S-boxes. However, the S-boxes with low XLtl;O] lead to faster convergence to the random XOR distribution.
We finally studied the influence of the S-boxes on the information Ieakage of the SP network. The simulation results are shown in Figures 8 through 11 . Here four types of information leakages are plotted against the number of rounds. After 3 rounds there is not much difference in the infomation leakage of any kind, regardless
